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State and federal aid 
a b s t r a c t 
This paper examines the effect of a federally supported school turnaround program in North Carolina 
elementary and middle schools. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that the turnaround 
program did not improve, and may have reduced, average school-level passing rates in math and read- 
ing. One potential contributor to that finding appears to be that the program increased the concentration 
of low-income students in treated schools. Based on teacher survey data, we find that, as was intended, 
treated schools brought in new principals and increased the time teachers devoted to professional de- 
velopment. At the same time, the program increased administrative burdens and distracted teachers, po- 
tentially reducing time available for instruction, and increased teacher turnover after the first full year 
of implementation. Overall, we find little evidence of success for North Carolina’s efforts to turn around 
low-performing schools under its Race to the Top grant. 










































fi  1. Introduction 
Programs to “turn around” consistently low-performing schools
have sprung up in states across the country, bolstered by the fed-
eral No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top programs. The
schools at the heart of these initiatives face problems ranging from
low test scores and student behavior problems to poor school lead-
ership and high staff turnover rates. The persistence of their prob-
lems and the fact that such schools typically serve high concen-
trations of low income and minority students made turning them
around a central part of the federal government’s recent effort s to
improve education. A key aspect of the school turnaround strat-
egy is the view that piecemeal reforms related to particular in-
puts, such as teacher qualifications or class sizes, will not solve
the problems of these schools. Instead what is needed, according
to this view, are broader whole-school reform efforts that com-
prehensively address the range of problems such schools face, in-
cluding weak leadership, low teacher morale, low expectations for
students, and poor school climate. Despite little rigorous research
on the potential for the school turnaround approach, the federal
government leveraged its limited funding for education – funding
that was temporarily greatly enhanced with post-recession stimu-∗ Corresponding author. 





0272-7757/Published by Elsevier Ltd. us dollars after 2009 – to induce states to adopt one of four clearly
pecified school turnaround strategies to improve their lowest per-
orming schools. 
This paper contributes to the surprisingly limited body of rig-
rous research on the school turnaround approach by examin-
ng a federally supported program in the state of North Carolina
alled “Turning Around the Lowest Achieving Schools,” or TALAS.
ecause the state used a clear cut off to identify the schools to
e turned around, we can use a regression discontinuity analysis
o determine the causal effects of the state’s program on schools
hat are close to the cut off. North Carolina is particularly interest-
ng for this study because the state has been surveying all teach-
rs in the state biannually for many years. Information from these
urveys makes it possible to investigate not only how the state’s
urnaround model affected student outcomes, but also the poten-
ial mechanisms through which the program exerted its influence
n the schools. 
A major purpose of the state’s TALAS program was to improve
tudent outcomes, with the specific goal of improving school-level
tudent passing rates by 20 percentage points in the turnaround
chools ( North Carolina Race to the Top Application, 2010 ). We
nd, however, that the turnaround program did not increase av-
rage achievement at either the school or the student level dur-
ng the first few years after the program was implemented. Instead
e find that passing rates at best stayed the same and may have































































































































f  allen. For reasons we discuss below, this negative finding differs
rom more positive findings that emerged from previous research
n this program ( Henry, Campbell, Thompson, & Townsend, 2014;
enry, Guthrie, & Townsend, 2015 ). 
Although we cannot pinpoint the specific causes of the dis-
ppointing student outcomes, we were able to explore a number
f both intended and unintended consequences of the turnaround
trategy that could have contributed to them. We find, for exam-
le, no evidence that the turnover of principals, which was a cen-
ral part of the strategy, increased the quality of school leadership
n the schools subject to turnaround. Consistent with the intent of
he program, we find that teachers devoted more time to profes-
ional development, but that they also faced more administrative
urdens, with no perceived improvement in school climate. An un-
ntended outcome was an increase in the share of low-income stu-
ents in the turnaround schools. 
. Background and prior policy research 
Individual states, including North Carolina, have long used a va-
iety of approaches to turn around their lowest performing schools.
heir effort s have been bolstered in recent years by $7 billion dol-
ars of federal funding in the form of Race to the Top (RttT) and
chool Improvement Grants ( Dragoset et al., 2016, 2017 ). States
hat received federal grants to improve their lowest achievement
chools were required to employ one of the following four specific
odels: 
Transformation model: Replace the principal; take steps to
ncrease teacher and school leader effectiveness; institute com-
rehensive instructional reform; increase learning time; create
ommunity-oriented schools; provide operational flexibility and
ustained support. 
Turnaround model: Replace the principal and rehire no more
han 50% of the staff; take steps to improve the school as in the
ransformation model. 
Restart model: Convert the school or close and reopen it under
ew management. 
School closure: Close the school and enroll the students who
ttended that school in other schools in the district that are higher
chieving. 
Both nationwide and in North Carolina, the majority of schools
hat received funding selected either the transformation or the
urnaround model. Central to these preferred models are the re-
lacement of the principal and the improvement of teachers. 
Concerns about the quality of school leadership reflect the cen-
ral role that principals play in schools as they make personnel
ecisions, set policies and practices, distribute leadership author-
ty, and influence school culture. Research documents that princi-
als vary in their effectiveness, especially in high-poverty schools
 Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin, 2012 ). By calling for the replacement
f principals in low-performing schools, federal policymakers ex-
ected the new principals to be more successful than the ones
hey replaced. However, replacing an experienced principal with
n inexperienced one may bring few benefits and could be coun-
erproductive ( Clark, Martorell, & Rockoff, 2009 ). 
With a new principal a school may benefit from a combi-
ation of transformational and instructional leadership, both of
hich are viewed as necessary but insufficient for success ( Marks
 Printy, 2003 ). Transformational leaders change school culture,
mphasize innovation, and support and empower teachers as part
f the decision-making process. Shared instructional leadership in-
olves active teamwork between the principal and teachers on cur-
iculum, instruction practices, and student assessments ( Marks &
rinty, 2003 ). Evidence shows that this approach can develop the
chool-wide capacity-building and ownership needed to sustain
chool reforms ( Copland, 2003 ). Principals also influence school quality through their personnel
ecisions ( Branch et al., 2012 ). It is well known that many teach-
rs tend to avoid schools serving minority and low income stu-
ents, and these disparities systematically affect student perfor-
ance ( Boyd, Lankford, & Wyckoff, 2007; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vig-
or, 2007, 2010; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Jackson, 2009 ).
ut studies also show that even after researchers statistically con-
rol for student demographics, teachers’ decisions to remain in a
chool are also strongly influenced by the working conditions in
he school, a major determinant of which is the quality of the
chool’s leadership ( Ladd, 2011; Loeb, Darling-Hammond, & Luczak,
005; Moore Johnson, Kraft, & Papay, 2012 ). 
In addition to principal change, the turnaround model requires
 school to replace 50% of its teachers. The usefulness of this policy
epends in part on the quality of the replacement teachers. Such
 requirement, for example, may pose a challenge for rural areas
ith a limited supply of qualified teachers to replace those who
re fired ( Cowen, Butler, Fowles, Streams, & Toma, 2012; Sipple &
rent, 2007 ). On a more positive note, some research has shown
hat changing the group of teachers in a school can improve their
oint productivity in low-performing schools ( Hansen, 2013 ). 
The transformation and turnaround models also call for more
nvestment in the professional development of teachers, a strategy
hat can be productive provided the program is high-quality ( Hill,
007 ). However, many studies document that the standard one-
hot programs not related to the curriculum do not make teachers
ore effective ( Garet et al., 2008, 2011 ). 
Despite the evidence that principal and teacher quality mat-
er, whether comprehensive school turnaround strategies of the
ype promoted by the federal government will improve the lowest
chieving schools is an empirical question. A review by the What
orks Clearinghouse, for example, found no studies of turnaround
rograms that met their standards for internal validity ( Herman
t al., 2008 ). A more recent review found that fundamental cul-
ural transformations are quite difficult, particularly with a short
indow of funding ( Anrig, 2015 ). The most careful causal study
n the United States to date is a regression discontinuity study of
chool turnaround programs in California ( Dee, 2012 ). Dee finds
hat the program significantly improved the test scores of students
n low-achieving schools, particularly among schools that replaced
he principal and at least 50% of the staff. One limitation of this
tudy is that it was based on a competitive federal School Improve-
ent Grant program, with only about half of the eligible bottom
% of schools receiving turnaround funding. The concern is that
he schools (among the lowest-performing schools) with the best
vailable staff or most supportive districts were the ones to apply
or and receive funding. Hence, the positive findings might not ap-
ly to all low-performing schools. A recent national study by the
.S. Department of Education found that the School Improvement
rants generated no benefits to student outcomes ( Dragoset et al.,
017 ). 
More positive evidence emerges from a set of studies of the
ame North Carolina program that we investigate in this paper
 Henry et al., 2014, 2015 ). In contrast to the regression disconti-
uity approach that we use, these prior North Carolina studies rely
n a difference-in-difference (DID) approach. In a concluding dis-
ussion, we reconcile our far less positive results with the positive
ndings from these earlier studies and argue that our RD approach
s the preferred approach for estimating the causal impacts of the
rogram. 
. North Carolina data and policy context 
North Carolina has been engaged in school turnaround effort s
or over 10 years, with much of its attention focused on low














































































p  performing high schools 1 . Drawing on that experience, the state
successfully competed for federal Race to the Top (RttT) funds to
turn around the lowest 5% of the state’s schools. The analysis in the
current paper focuses on this recent program – Turning Around the
Lowest Achieving Schools, commonly called TALAS – that began in
2011. 
We use data for elementary and middle schools in the 2010
through 2014 school years from the North Carolina Department of
Public Instruction (NCDPI) and the North Carolina Education Re-
search Data Center, as well as the 2010, 2012, and 2014 iterations
of the North Carolina Teacher Working Conditions Survey 2 . We
separately analyze the time use and school climate measures from
the survey. Using the 2010 baseline data, we collapse the school
climate data into seven factor composites for teachers’ percep-
tions of their working conditions: leadership, instructional prac-
tices, professional development, community relations, student con-
duct, school facilities and resources, and time use. This method re-
sults in a Z-score (with an average of zero and a standard deviation
of one) for each factor in each school by year. See Appendix A for
more details on the survey questions and factor analysis for the
school climate data. 
For each school in each year, our data include the school-level
passing rates for end-of-grade (EOG) tests; student-level test scores
and passing rates; and school characteristics such as the principal
of record, one-year teacher turnover, percent of teachers with three
or fewer years of experience, student behavior, and student demo-
graphics 3 . Students are required to complete EOG tests in reading
and math in grades 3–8 and in science in grades 5 and 8. We as-
sume that schools that disappear from the NCDPI data closed. 
NCDPI based assignment to treatment on a school’s 2010 com-
posite score, calculated as the number of passing scores on read-
ing, mathematics, science, and end-of-course tests as a percent of
all such tests taken in the school 4 . The bottom 5% of schools in
each school type (elementary, middle, and high school) were to be
placed in the TALAS program, with additional high schools placed
in the program based on low graduation rates. We limit our anal-
ysis to elementary and middle schools, in part because their cut
point for assignment to the program was based on test scores
alone and was not complicated by the inclusion of graduation
rates. Leaving out high schools also reduces the potential for con-1 Created in 2006, the District and School Transformation department focused 
effort s on the 66 lowest-performing high schools to increase student achievement. 
The program expanded to 37 middle schools in 2007. All schools received some 
support, but these schools received a transformation coach, instructional facilitators 
to provide instruction and classroom-level support, and a reform or redesign plan 
( Department of Public Instruction, 2011 ). The interventions were most intensive in 
high schools, where they were judged to have modest but significant positive effects 
on student test scores ( Thomson, Brown, Townsend, Henry, & Fortner, 2011 ). 
2 North Carolina started its biannual Teacher Working Conditions survey in 2002. 
The survey asked questions designed to elicit educators’ time use (in ranges of 
hours per week) and impressions of school climate (on an agree-disagree 4- or 5- 
point scale). From 2010 to 2014, the individual-level teacher response rate averaged 
over 90%. Controlling for response rates does not change our results. All schools 
had at least one response in 2010 and 2012, while one treatment and one control 
chool were missing responses in 2014 (0.4% of the main data we examine). We 
replace the missing 2014 data with the 2012 value in our main analysis; dropping 
the missing schools does not change our results. 
3 We identify a change in school principal by using the NCERDC data on educator- 
level pay. When schools had more than one principal in a given year, we treated 
the principal with the most months in the school in that year as the principal of 
record. If multiple principals had equal time, we took the principal who started the 
year as the principal of record. If the school was missing a principal in a given year, 
we assumed the principal from the prior year remained in the school (that is, we 
assumed no turnover). In 2010, a quirk in the data led to 96 schools, or 5.4% of 
the total schools, missing teacher turnover data. We used the 2009 estimate as the 
baseline teacher turnover for 62 of the schools; the remaining 34 schools had just 
opened in 2010 and thus had no turnover relative to 2009. No schools were missing 
other school-level NCDPI data in any year. 



















ounding the effects of TALAS with the more intensive high school
ntervention from the previous state-sponsored program. We ex-
lude private, charter, alternative, and special education schools,
ecause they were not eligible for TALAS. 
89 elementary and middle schools out of a total 1772 public
lementary and secondary schools met the eligibility criterion in
010 5 . Four treated schools closed in 2012, one closed in 2013, and
ne closed in 2014. Several control schools closed as well, leaving
3 treatment schools out of 1753 schools (4.7%) that were open
rom 2010 through 2014. We require schools to appear in all years
010–2014 to be included in the analysis. Including schools before
hey closed did not change the results. 
As per federal guidelines, each TALAS school had to implement
ne of the US Department of Education’s four federal models in
he schools ( Department of Public Instruction, 2014 ) 6 . By the end
f the 2011 school year, all TALAS schools had taken some steps
f an intervention model, but many of these effort s had not yet
een fully implemented ( Whalen, 2011 ). About 85% of the TALAS
chools, and all of the rural TALAS schools, chose the transforma-
ion model, which focused on the removal of the principal but not
he removal of staff. No schools chose the restart model. 
In summer 2011, the state introduced an induction and mentor-
ng program for new teachers, as well as three Regional Leadership
cademies for principals ( Duffrin, 2012 ). In the 2012 school year,
istrict, school, and instructional coaches provided customized
upport and professional development to TALAS schools, though
urnover in the coaching staff presented problems in the continu-
ty and quality of the training the schools and principals received
 Department of Public Instruction, 2013b; Henry et al., 2014, 2015 ).
oaches generally served more than one school, with an average
f about one day per week spent at a given TALAS school ( Henry
t al., 2014 ). The particular strategies employed by the coaches
iffered by school 7 . In general the leadership coaching strategies
sed in turnaround schools did not differ substantially from those
sed by mentors in non-turnaround schools, though meetings were
ore frequent ( Henry et al., 2014 ). Required annual progress re-
orts discussed the professional development provided to prin-
ipals and teachers, with a particular emphasis on school and
eacher leadership, as well as teacher recruitment effort s by princi-
als ( Department of Public Instruction, 2013b, 2014 ) 8 . Schools con-
inued these strategies in the 2013 and 2014 school years. Our
nalysis follows schools, students, and teachers through 2014. 
The school-level TALAS program took place in the context of ad-
itional RttT-funded reforms in North Carolina, including a district-
evel turnaround program run by the state’s District and School
ransformation department that had been established in 2007. This
roup viewed the district as an important unit for change because
istricts make important policy and personnel decisions, includ-
ng principal staffing decisions. We focus here on the school-level5 There were 66 treated elementary schools (5% of 1,321) and 23 treated middle 
schools (5% of 451). 
6 Additionally, the state had to: ( 1 ) ensure that all TALAS schools and districts 
eceive school- and district-specific support to increase student achievement, ( 2 ) 
require districts to focus on the lowest-achieving schools, ( 3 ) increase strategies and 
options in TALAS plans, and (4) develop several STEM high school networks (North 
arolina Race to the Top Application, 2010). Steps 1–3 applied to all TALAS schools, 
hile Step 4 pertained to high schools. 
7 For instance, one school implemented a 1:1 laptop initiative, a K-5 STEM pro- 
ram, and digital literacy programs, while another implemented weekly meetings 
or Algebra I teachers to plan lessons and a focus on individualized literacy im- 
rovement plans for students 3 grades below level ( Department of Public Instruc- 
ion, 2013a ). 
8 90% of the Regional Leadership Academy graduates were placed in a “high- 
eeds” school by October 2013 ( Department of Public Instruction, 2013b ), though 
hese were not necessarily TALAS schools. Some professional development materials 
for school leaders are available here: http://dst.ncdpi.wikispaces.net/PD+for+School+ 
Leaders . 
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Fig. 1. Treatment uptake by school type. 



















































9 The first-stage model estimates the jump in treatment probability at the cutoff
point with the following form: 
(1) T urnaroun d s = α I( A s ≤ 0 ) + f ( A s ) + γ X s + νs 
where f(A s ) is a function of school s ’s baseline assignment variable and ( X s ) repre- 
sents baseline control variables. The function f(A s ) is allowed to differ on each side 
of the cutoff. Because the discontinuity essentially functions as random assignment, 
including baseline covariates is not strictly necessary ( Lee & Lemieux, 2010 ); we 
include them to reduce sampling variability. The coefficient α represents the per- 
centage point increase in the probability of receiving treatment at the cutoff. We 
estimate the 2SLS estimate of the effect of this jump in continuity with the follow- 
ing: 
(2) Y s = π ̂ T urnaroun d s + g( A s ) + βX s + ε s 
where Y s is the outcome of interest regressed on the predicted probability of re- 
ceiving the turnaround treatment, a function of school’s assignment variable g(A s ) , 
and the control variables X s included in Model 1. Under assumptions of monotonic- 
ity and excludability, this system of equations functions as an instrumental variable 
estimate ( Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996; Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Hahn, Todd, & 
Van der Klaauw, 2001 ). ALAS program, but schools above and below the school-level cut
oint also could have received this district-level support. 
. Estimation strategy 
We estimate the effect of the TALAS program by comparing out-
omes for schools just below and just above the discontinuity in
reatment created by the 2010 composite score assignment rule.
entral to our regression discontinuity (RD) design are the clear
ut points that determine which schools are treated under TALAS.
he cut points for elementary and middle schools differ slightly to
nsure that 5% of each school type is included in TALAS. By center-
ng each school’s composite score on the applicable cut point and
abeling that 0, we can pool them into a single analysis. Fig. 1 dis-
lays the treatment uptake by the 2010 baseline score by school
ype and overall in two-percentage point bins. 
The main takeaway from Fig. 1 is the strong discontinuity in
ptake at the cut point. We note, however, that two schools above
he cut point did not comply with their assignments. It is not clear
ow two elementary schools above the elementary school cutoff
eceived treatment, though we note that their scores are below the
iddle school cutoff, which suggests that these schools may have
een misclassified as middle schools in the assignment process.
iven the ambiguity of the process, we use a “fuzzy” regression
iscontinuity ( Campbell, 1969 ). The intended treatment population
ncludes those below the cutoff and the intended control popula-
ion includes those above that point. This comparison provides an
ntent-to-treat estimate; scaling up the estimated difference by di-
iding by the compliance rate provides a treatment-on-the-treated
stimate. The estimates should be interpreted as a local average
reatment effect (LATE, Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Angrist, Imbens, &
ubin, 1996; Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001 ). In other words,
he estimate is only for those whose uptake is affected by the as-
ignment around the cut point. Although the RD approach provides a strong case for causality,
t has three potential limitations. First, it identifies treatment ef-
ects only at the discontinuity cutoff, which limits generalizability
f treatment effects are not constant across the assignment vari-
ble. 
Second, specifying the correct functional form presents a chal-
enge. We present a variety of specifications for each outcome of
nterest, using both nonparametric and parametric methods ( Lee
 Lemieux, 2010 ). The nonparametric estimates are a series of lo-
al linear regressions performed at various bandwidths on either
ide of the cutoff. We use the optimal bandwidths proposed by
mbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) as our preferred bandwidth. For
he parametric analysis, we implement a fuzzy RD design with a
wo-stage parametric model that functions as an instrumental vari-
ble analysis ( Hahn et al., 2001; Lee & Lemieux, 2010; Van Der
laauw, 2008 ) 9 . Because we do not know the “true” relationship
etween the outcome and the assignment variable, we cannot be
ertain whether the functional form should be linear, quadratic,






















































































2  cubic, or something else entirely. We follow a test proposed by Lee
and Lemieux (2010) to find the best-fitting parametric form 10 . The
models that follow use the simplest form not rejected by this test;
the vast majority have a linear spline on either side of the cutoff.
Appendix B includes additional details on the specifications. 
Third, RD has much less statistical power than a randomized
experiment ( Goldberger, 1972; Schochet, 2009 ). Although in theory
we should use the smallest bandwidth possible around the cut-
off to arrive at the least biased estimates, shrinking the bandwidth
simultaneously decreases the power of our analysis. We balance
these considerations by estimating parametric models with vary-
ing bandwidths. We use + / −16 percentage points from the com-
posite score cut point as our largest bandwidth in our parametric
analysis, as this size includes all but two treated schools, allows
us to divide our sample into two-percentage point bins, and bal-
ances the distance from the cutoff available for the treated and un-
treated populations. We also report results based on a bandwidth
of + / −10 percentage points. 
The RD design builds on the observation that whether a school
is just above or just below the cut point is essentially random.
One potential concern is that schools may manipulate their base-
line scores ( Lee & Lemieux, 2010 ) and in effect choose to receive
treatment or not. Given that NCDPI determined the cut point after
students took the 2010 baseline assessments ( Conaty, 2011 ), such
behavior seems highly unlikely. Moreover, as long as schools, even
while having some influence, cannot precisely control the assign-
ment variable, variation near the treatment will still be random-
ized much like a randomized experiment ( Lee & Lemieux, 2010 ) 11 .
In any case, we find no empirical evidence of such manipulation 12 .
One way to confirm that assignment at the cutoff is “as good as
random” is to check for discontinuities at the cut point in various
baseline characteristics, including the assignment variable. Table
1 displays both the average value of various baseline characteris-
tics above and below the cutoff (Panel A) and the estimated value
at the cutoff point (Panel B). Panel B uses the same parametric
function described above. Panel A shows that schools below the
cutoff have lower average composite scores, higher proportions of
free and reduced price lunch (FRL) and black students, lower av-
erage daily attendance, more short term suspensions, and higher
teacher turnover than schools above the cutoff, patterns that are
expected given the documented relationship between student test
scores and various measures of disadvantage. Schools below the
cut point are also more likely to have been in the 2007 DST school
turnaround program and be assigned to the 2011 RttT district-
level program. These differences indicate that a simple compari-10 Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest starting with a linear model, inserting bin indi- 
cator variables into the polynomial regression, and jointly testing their significance. 
For instance, we placed K-2 bin indicators (each two percentage points wide), B k , 
for k = 2 to K – 1, into our model above: 
(3) Y s = π ̂ T urnaroun d s + g( A s ) + βX s + 
K−1 ∑ 
k =2 
ϕ k B k + ε s 
We then tested the null hypothesis that ϕ 2 = ϕ 3 = … = ϕ K- 1 = 0. Starting with a 
first order polynomial (flexible across the discontinuity), we added a higher order to 
the model until the bin indicator variables were no longer jointly significant. This 
method also tests for discontinuities at unexpected points along the assignment 
variable; we did not find any. We limit the flexibility to a third-order polynomial. 
11 Alternatively, perhaps NCDPI manipulated the threshold to usher particular 
schools into the program. The 5% cutoff is a federal standard, and the state would 
have little room for shifting schools. Though it seems unlikely, we cannot rule out 
this possibility. Importantly, such manipulation would constitute an internal validity 
problem only if NCDPI selected schools that had similar outcomes on the assign- 
ment variable but for some unobserved reason had a higher likelihood of positive 
(or negative) outcomes under the treatment ( Dee, 2012 ). 
12 If no manipulation occurred, the distribution of schools by composite score 
should have a normal distribution. Using methods suggested by McCrary (2008) , 
we examine whether there is a break in the distribution at the cutoff. The small 
difference is not statistically significant at traditional levels of confidence (coeffi- 




















on of schools above and below the cutoff, as in the Henry et al.
2014, 2015 ) papers, could produce biased estimates of the effects
f the policy intervention. However, when we focus on a compar-
son of schools at the cutoff point (as in Panel B), the differences
isappear. See Appendix C for additional details about differences
n programs away from the cut point. 
We now turn to our results. We first examine whether student
utcomes improved. We then use several outcome measures to try
o understand the patterns we observe in the student outcome
ata. In the results below, we label our nonparametric estimates
s NP and our parametric estimates as 2SLS. 
. Student outcomes 
A major objective of the TALAS program was to improve student
utcomes, with the specific goal of improving school-level compos-
te scores by 20 percentage points. Thus, the first question we ask
s whether the program succeeded in raising student achievement
r improving other student outcomes. We answer this question us-
ng two approaches. The first and most central approach uses the
chool as the unit of observation and examines the patterns of
omposite scores in math and reading passing rates, as well as stu-
ent behavior, through 2014. In the formal part of this school-level
nalysis, we report results by student demographic subgroups for
he years 2012, 2013, and 2014. The second approach uses student-
evel data for students who were third graders in 2010 but follows
hem for only two years because after that they move to middle
chools that may or may not be treated. 
Fig. 2 displays the composite, math, and reading outcomes
ased on a simple model with no additional control variables. The
ray line is the 2010 baseline trend, the solid black line is the 2014
egment for schools intended as controls, and the dashed black
ine is the 2014 segment for schools intended for treatment 13 . The
ignificant decline in passing rates between 2010 and 2014 (see the
ifference between the gray and the black lines) reflects the fact
hat the state changed its tests and raised the corresponding pass-
ng standards during the period. This change in standards, how-
ver, should not interfere with our estimates of the program ef-
ects, which are measured at the 2010 cut point (denoted by zero
n the figure) for schools that are virtually identical in all measur-
ble dimensions. Contrary to expectations, the figure indicates that
t the cut point, the 2014 passing rates are lower in the treated
han in the control schools. 
More formally, but generally consistent with the figure, Table
 provides no evidence that the program had positive effects on
chool wide pass rates overall or for various subgroups defined by
ender, race, or FRL status. Results are reported by post-program
ear and for various model specifications. The first row of the table
rovides the first stage estimate of the increase in assignment to
he treatment caused by the discontinuity 14 . As expected, there is
 strong uptick in treatment probability at the discontinuity, and
he F-statistic for the first stage is well above the recommended
inimum of 10 ( Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Staiger & Stock, 1997 ). 
The estimated treatment effects on pass rates are in the fol-
owing rows. We highlight outcomes that are significant at p < .1013 In theory, we could examine whether the treatment effect is constant below the 
ut point by examining whether the treated and untreated dashed lines are paral- 
el ( Tang, Cook, & Kisbu-Sakarya, 2015; Wing & Cook, 2013 ). Indeed, it appears that 
he drop in scores was smaller at very low scoring schools. However, we are ap- 
rehensive about making generalizations beyond the cut point in our context, both 
ecause the lowest-achieving schools had less distance to fall and because other 
rograms may have affected schools away from out cut point (see Appendix C ). 
14 The first stage coefficient may change slightly from estimate to estimate, as the 
K bandwidths change in nonparametric estimates and the baseline controls dif- 
er depending on the outcome variable in parametric estimates. The first stage dis- 
layed is for the overall math estimate. 
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Table 1 
Comparison of 2010 baseline characteristics above and below the cutoff value. 
2010 values Panel A: average value ( + / −16%) Panel B: estimated value at cutoff(1) 
Below cutoff ( −16% to 0%) Above cutoff (0 to 16%) P-value of difference Below cutoff Above cutoff P-value of difference 
Assignment score −5.158 9.285 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 N/A 
(0.412) (0.212) (0.0 0 0) (0.0 0 0) 
Percent FRL in school 86.410 75.269 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ 83.746 86.122 .331 
(1.253) (0.602) (2.4 4 4) (1.149) 
Percent black in school 64.886 46.888 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ 59.557 59.201 .946 
(2.718) (1.033) (5.298) (2.278) 
Percent Hispanic in school 16.001 16.411 .819 17.728 16.404 .673 
(1.825) (0.685) (3.133) (1.540) 
Student daily attendance 94.478 94.861 .002 ∗∗ 94.872 94.497 .147 
(0.121) (0.048) (0.259) (0.117) 
Short term suspensions 32.266 20.638 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ 27.476 27.560 .990 
(3.226) (1.057) (6.433) (2.569) 
1-year principal turnover 25.316 20.501 .336 22.484 27.466 .618 
(4.923) (1.929) (9.979) (4.851) 
Principals w/ 0–3 yrs. exp. 43.038 42.597 .942 45.006 45.662 .953 
(5.606) (2.363) (11.095) (5.527) 
1-year teacher turnover 16.278 13.952 .013 ∗ 16.715 16.370 .860 
(1.046) (0.347) (1.952) (0.882) 
Teachers w/ 0–3 yrs. exp. 25.467 23.640 .148 24.720 26.462 .423 
(1.089) (0.498) (2.175) (1.049) 
Percent in orig. turnaround 16.456 4.100 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ 9.547 10.098 .945 
(4.198) (0.947) (8.050) (2.809) 
Percent in RttT districts 41.772 15.490 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ 37.849 30.666 .510 
(5.584) (1.729) (10.897) (4.716) 
N 79 439 
+ p-value < .1, ∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗ p-value < .01, ∗∗∗ p-value < .001. 
(1) Panel B based on a parametric RD with a linear spline function for schools + / −16% from the cutoff with no additional control variables ( X s ). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Fig. 2. 2014 composite, math, and reading scores. 
Note: estimates of outcomes in 2010 and 2014 within + / −16% using our linear spline model with no additional controls (N = 518 schools). Untreated post-period segment 










i  or a majority of estimates. Although the estimates differ some-
hat across specifications and are not all statistically significant,
ll of the coefficients for both math and reading overall and
or subgroups defined by gender, race, and SES are negative for
013 and 2014. Our preferred estimates are based on the + / −16%andwidth, which consistently exhibit the smallest standard
rrors. 
For overall pass rates in math in 2014, the 95% confidence inter-
al (CI) of this preferred estimate is [ −10.355, 0.139], and in read-
ng in 2014 it is [ −6.871, 0.421]. Thus, while we cannot rule them
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Table 2 
School-level math, reading, and behavioral outcomes; estimates by method, bandwidth, and year. 
2012 2013 2014 
NP (1) 2SLS (2) NP (1) 2SLS (2) NP (1) 2SLS (2) 
Bandwidth Varies + / −16% + / −10% Varies + / −16% + / −10% Varies + / −16% + / −10% 
First stage 0.928 ∗∗∗ 0.976 ∗∗∗ 0.960 ∗∗∗ 0.979 ∗∗∗ 0.976 ∗∗∗ 0.960 ∗∗∗ 0.949 ∗∗∗ 0.976 ∗∗∗ 0.960 ∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.017) (0.028) (0.015) (0.017) (0.028) (0.035) (0.017) (0.028) 
F-Statistic N/A 7,66,377 1,56,696 N/A 7,66,377 1,56,696 N/A 7,66,377 1,56,696 
Math passing rates 
Overall 1.125 −1.521 0.171 −5.267 + −3.299 −2.465 −6.094 −5.108 + −3.655 
(2.263) (1.865) (2.185) (2.948) (2.117) (2.476) (3.763) (2.677) (3.095) 
Female students 0.495 −2.186 −1.024 −6.064 −2.805 −1.828 −5.370 −4.402 −2.705 
(2.332) (1.980) (2.267) (3.952) (2.433) (2.857) (3.817) (2.756) (3.262) 
Male students 0.388 −0.810 1.248 −6.127 ∗ −4.021 ∗ −3.358 −6.461 + −5.428 ∗ −4.051 
(2.324) (2.001) (2.450) (2.625) (2.004) (2.338) (3.898) (2.761) (3.183) 
Black students (3) 0.293 −0.556 0.059 −4.831 + −3.943 ∗ −2.441 −1.591 −3.279 −1.239 
(2.794) (2.121) (2.524) (2.826) (1.722) (2.014) (3.448) (2.591) (2.977) 
Hispanic students (3) 0.576 0.704 0.828 −6.691 + −5.185 −5.777 −8.319 + −6.719 + −7.156 + 
(3.454) (2.518) (2.947) (3.568) (3.245) (3.548) (4.676) (3.495) (4.095) 
FRL students 2.148 −0.922 0.810 −2.726 −3.176 −2.264 −4.757 −4.675 + −2.995 
(2.929) (1.846) (2.185) (2.756) (2.006) (2.339) (3.817) (2.632) (3.003) 
Reading passing rates 
Overall −0.486 −1.898 −0.216 −5.464 ∗ −1.802 −2.517 −3.440 −3.225 + −2.912 
(2.113) (1.465) (1.819) (2.678) (1.488) (1.873) (2.568) (1.860) (2.294) 
Female students −1.976 −2.665 + −1.695 −8.163 ∗ −2.964 + −3.795 + −3.764 −3.394 + −2.735 
(2.721) (1.506) (1.888) (3.565) (1.706) (2.107) (2.994) (2.061) (2.570) 
Male students 0.103 −1.4 4 4 1.041 −3.595 −0.887 −1.428 −3.342 −3.001 −3.028 
(2.461) (1.776) (2.205) (2.239) (1.485) (1.906) (2.401) (1.904) (2.322) 
Black students (3) −0.372 −2.018 −0.656 −2.555 −1.809 −2.740 + −2.757 −3.799 ∗ −3.430 + 
(2.079) (1.742) (2.098) (1.895) (1.260) (1.593) (2.354) (1.675) (2.061) 
Hispanic students (3) −2.413 −2.749 −1.885 −5.421 −5.340 ∗ −6.463 ∗ −1.555 −3.643 −4.575 
(3.927) (2.639) (3.186) (3.585) (2.417) (2.748) (3.825) (3.003) (3.198) 
FRL students 0.476 −1.078 0.615 −2.695 −1.513 −2.354 −0.960 −2.218 −1.794 
(2.295) (1.421) (1.740) (1.960) (1.332) (1.663) (2.706) (1.740) (2.141) 
Behavioral outcomes 
Attendance −1.248 ∗∗ −0.959 ∗c −0.394 + −0.685 + 0.269q 0.215 0.174 0.173 0.835 
(0.418) (0.376) (0.211) (0.367) −0.259 (0.219) (0.953) (0.478) (0.574) 
Suspensions (per 100 students) 21.580 ∗ 13.672 + q 6.473 14.238 + 8.821 q 3.549 25.924 ∗∗ 4.574 4.601 
(9.500) (7.276) (5.400) (8.029) −7.079 (5.804) (9.435) (4.659) (5.561) 
N 1753 518 294 1753 518 294 1753 518 294 
Controls for 2010 baseline composite? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls for 2010 outcome & school level? NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
+ p-value < .1, ∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗ p-value < .01, ∗∗∗ p-value < .001. 
(1) Nonparametric bandwidths calculated from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) . 














































fi  out, any positive effects on pass rates are likely to be small. With
respect to the gender subgroups, of note are the consistently large
negative effects in math for males in both 2013 and 2014 and read-
ing for females in 2013. Other subgroup effects are mixed, with
some evidence of negative effects for black students in math in
2013 and reading in 2014. For Hispanic students, we find some ev-
idence of negative effects in math in 2014 and reading in 2013.
Many of the estimates are not statistically significant at traditional
levels, which means we cannot rule out small positive effects for
some of the subgroups. Nonetheless, given the many negative co-
efficients in the table, we can be quite confident in ruling out the
hypothesis that the program had large positive effects, either over-
all or for any of the subgroups. 
Moreover, we can rule out the possibility that any negative ef-
fects reflect prior year trends by extending the preferred analysis
back in time to 2006, as shown in Fig. 3 . In the subgroup of schools
that were open from 2006 through 2014, we find statistically sig-
nificant negative effects in the overall composite score in 2014, in
math in 2013 and 2014, and in reading in 2014. For the subgroup of
schools open from 2006–2014, the 2014 95% CI is [ −11.492, −2.717]
in math and [ −7.721, −1.057] in reading. We find no evidence of
placebo effects in 2006 through 2009. 
To supplement our analysis of how the program affected pass-
ing rates in the treated schools, we also explore how it affectedtudent behavior (see bottom part of Table 2 ). We find that the
ALAS program decreased average daily attendance by point esti-
ates of 0.4 to 1.2 percentage points in 2012, though the effect
issipates in later years. At the same time, we find some evidence
hat the program resulted in a higher rate of student suspensions
n 2012, with point estimates ranging from a 6.5 to 21.6 increase
n suspensions per 100 students. In sum, the schools subject to the
tate’s turnaround program exhibit worse, or at least no better, stu-
ent outcomes than comparable untreated schools. 
Next, we turn to the student-level longitudinal analysis of stu-
ents who had been in schools just below or just above the cut
oint in 2010. We limit the analysis to students who were in their
hird grade year in 2010. The sample includes students in schools
t various bandwidths from the cut points. Although these stu-
ents have test scores below the state average, students in schools
ust above the cut point are similar to students in schools just
elow the cut point. The columns labeled “all” in Table 3 show
hat the program had no observable overall effect on the passing
ates of the treated students in either math or reading, where the
reated students are those who were in treated schools in third
rade. This null average effect, however, masks some differential
ffects by student achievement level. For third grade students who
ere at Level II in math – that is, just below passing – in 2010, we
nd weak evidence that the turnaround program increased their
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Fig. 3. Test results by year. 
Note: based on a separate + / −16% linear spline estimate with the same controls as Table 2 ; year 2010 excludes baseline scores due to collinearity with the outcome. Only 


























































15 We find no evidence of a difference in treatment effects by whether the schools 
were in RttT Districts (results not shown). 
16 Schools were exempted from the replacement requirement if they had recently 
replaced their principal as part of the earlier turnaround program and the school 
had made substantial improvements on their composite score during the new prin- 
cipal’s tenure ( Henry et al., 2014 ). robability of passing by 11.3 to 21.0 percentage points in 2012,
hen most of them were in fifth grade. These are matched with
 0.127 to 0.289 SD increase in test scores for this group. Any ini-
ial positive effect for this group of students would be consistent
ith the view that teachers in the turnaround schools concen-
rated more effort on students at the borderline of passing than
id teachers in other schools. Following 2012, many of the stu-
ents moved to middle schools that were not turnaround schools,
nd the gains faded as the students continued to progress through
chool (full results not shown). The passing rate point estimates
or the Level II students in 2013 (when most would have been
ixth graders) range from 2.2 (SE = 4.2) to 4.6 (SE = 2.9) percent-
ge points. The magnitude and precision, though not the direc-
ion, of these estimates are sensitive to our choice of bandwidth.
ence the initial positive effects on Level II students in the treated
chools appear to be short term effects at best. 
At the same time, we find consistently large reductions (point
stimates of 0.356 to 0.641 SD) in reading scores for those who
ere in the highest category in 2010. There is no associated drop
n passing, likely because these students score well above the
ass mark. Recall that we follow students regardless of their 2012
chool. Hence the observed decline in the test scores of the high-
st achievers is consistent either with teachers concentrating less
ttention on them or on potential negative effects from changing
chools, a topic to which we return below. Further, these negative
ffects continue into at least one additional year (full results not
hown). The point estimates for the top category of reading stu-
ents range from −0.321 SDs (SE = 0.207) to −0.740 (SE = 0.314) in
013 (when most would have been sixth graders). The 2014 esti-
ates (when most would have been seventh graders) are null. 
In sum, the turnaround program did not increase average
chievement at either the school or the student level, and there
s some evidence that it reduced schoolwide pass rates and thei
assing rates of some groups of students 15 . Based on the student
evel analysis, the only students that may have gained from the
rogram were those who were just below passing in 2010, though
hese gains did not persist and were not consistent across specifi-
ations. 
. Explaining the patterns 
With our detailed data on principals, teachers, and students, we
an explore several possible explanations for the test score results:
rincipal and teacher turnover, teacher time use, school climate,
nd the concentration of disadvantaged students in TALAS schools.
Consistent with the heavy use of the transformation option, we
nd that school principals left the treated schools at higher rates
han other schools during 2012, the first full year after the program
as implemented, though the effect is not statistically significant
see Fig. 4 and Table 4 ) 16 . The effectiveness of removing a prin-
ipal depends on whether the new principals are more effective
han the departing principals. Table 4 shows that the program led
o a higher proportion of principals with less than four years of
xperience by 2014. 
We find an uptick in teacher turnover in the year after the
ncrease in principal turnover. Turnover may have increased be-
ause teachers waited to experience a full year of the program
efore changing schools, or because new principals had to wait a
ear to make staffing changes 17 . We find no change in the pro-17 Several schools mentioned placing low-performing teachers on action plans 
n their 2012 annual report, with the intention to remove them if they did not 
310 J.A. Heissel, H.F. Ladd / Economics of Education Review 62 (2018) 302–320 
Table 3 
Individual-level math & reading outcomes; average test scores and estimated treatment effects by student baseline performance level and subject, based on 2SLS model. 
Math (1) Reading (1) 
Subgroup (based on 2010 Score): All Level I Level II Level III Level IV All Level I Level II Level III Level IV 
2012 passing rates 
+ /-16% (2) 0.352 11.695 11.273 0.285 −1.506 −3.314 1.500 −3.612 −1.164 −3.184 
(2.498) (22.177) (7.857) (2.539) (1.949) (3.188) (5.093) (7.711) (3.455) (3.240) 
N 23,862 1355 5614 13,667 3226 23,865 6520 5419 9651 2275 
+ /-10% (2) 4.879 + 1.067 21.034 ∗ 4.459 −1.640 −0.919 4.574 −1.857 1.227 −4.739 
(2.786) (25.097) (9.570) (2.790) (2.025) (3.838) (5.985) (9.213) (4.154) (4.622) 
N 13,190 890 3482 7410 1408 13,194 4079 3086 5017 1012 
+ /-5% (2) −0.508 −11.317 17.323 −1.028 −1.437 −7.198 9.598 −13.396 −5.260 −9.205 
(4.283) (39.718) (13.447) (4.527) (1.457) (6.402) (10.009) (14.206) (6.946) (7.794) 
N 5766 397 1637 3166 566 5770 1866 1374 2131 399 
2012 standardized scores 
+ /-16% (2) 0.005 −0.423 0.155 0.008 0.025 −0.016 0.047 0.015 0.001 −0.393 ∗
(0.069) (0.373) (0.109) (0.071) (0.147) (0.049) (0.099) (0.086) (0.057) (0.175) 
N 23,398 1143 5410 13,620 3225 23,277 5988 5369 9645 2275 
+ /-10% (2) 0.086 −0.397 0.289 ∗ 0.083 0.121 0.025 0.177 0.083 0.017 −0.356 + 
(0.076) (0.430) (0.135) (0.076) (0.166) (0.061) (0.124) (0.103) (0.070) (0.190) 
N 12,887 755 3348 7377 1407 12,822 3737 3057 5016 1012 
+ /-5% (2) −0.035 0.650 0.127 −0.052 0.179 −0.130 0.305 −0.172 −0.157 −0.641 ∗
(0.125) (0.696) (0.175) (0.130) (0.246) (0.105) (0.205) (0.177) (0.119) (0.273) 
N 5639 346 1576 3152 565 5610 1720 1361 2130 399 
+ p-value < .1, ∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗ p-value < .01, ∗∗∗ p-value < .001. 
(1) Columns split into all students from 2010 and separate analyses by 2010 category. Levels I and II represent failing ratings. N lower for test scores than passing rates; 
small number of missing test scores retained score category. 
(2) Analysis uses linear 2SLS models for students who were in treated and untreated schools within the given cutoff in the baseline year. All models control for the school- 
level baseline composite score, student-level baseline math scores, student-level baseline reading scores, and interactions between these continuous variables, an indicator 
for being below the assignment score (creating a spline), and the baseline outcome level (to allow for different relationships in the data for different levels of ability). The 
analysis clusters standard errors for the student’s 2010 school. If anything, results are stronger without controlling for both tests; we include both tests to be conservative. 
Fig. 4. 2012 and 2013 principal and teacher turnover. 
Note: estimates of outcomes in 2010 and 2014 within + / −16% using our linear spline model with no additional controls (N = 518 schools). Untreated post-period segment 
not constrained to be parallel with pre-period segments. Displayed bin width = 2-percentage points. 
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Table 4 
Principal and teacher turnover; estimates by method and year. 
2012 2013 2014 
NP (1) 2SLS (2) NP (1) 2SLS (2) NP (1) 2SLS (2) 
Bandwidth Varies + / −16% + / −10% Varies + / −16% + / −10% Varies + / −16% + / −10% 
1-year principal turnover 17.765 23.292 q 20.433 9.993 9.654 q 12.766 −5.312 −4.687 −3.464 
(11.013) (16.514) (13.682) (10.803) (13.452) (11.260) (11.055) (9.917) (12.061) 
Principals with 0–3 years of exp. −0.738 −2.406 −1.083 15.812 23.306 ∗ 24.394 + 31.589 ∗ 27.707 ∗ 32.437 ∗
(11.961) (11.433) (14.168) (14.060) (11.010) (13.609) (14.022) (11.169) (13.740) 
1-year teacher turnover 1.104 1.037 0.322 3.324 5.292 ∗∗ 5.377 ∗ 2.688 2.341 2.810 
(3.024) (2.227) (2.617) (2.585) (1.771) (2.181) (2.568) (2.399) (3.0 0 0) 
Teachers with 0–3 years of exp. 2.748 0.021 −0.124 2.708 0.857 c 1.821 1.729 1.627 3.701 
(3.597) (2.490) (2.983) (3.520) (5.484) (3.106) (3.841) (2.732) (3.097) 
N 1753 518 294 1753 518 294 1753 518 294 
Controls for 2010 baseline composite? YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Controls for school level? NO YES NO NO YES YES NO YES NO 
+ p-value < .1, ∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗ p-value < .01, ∗∗∗ p-value < .001. 
(1) Nonparametric bandwidths calculated from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) . 
(2) Linear spline equation used in parametric 2SLS models unless otherwise noted; q = quadratic equation used; c = cubic equation used. 
Fig. 5. Staff turnover by year. 
Note: based on a separate + / −16% linear spline estimate with no additional controls for each year. Only includes schools that appear in all years 2009–2014 (N = 512 schools 
























b  ortion of inexperienced teachers. Fig. 5 verifies the principal and
eacher turnover results did not reflect prior-year trends. The fig-
re shows no effect in placebo pre-treatment years back to 2009,
ut a large effect in 2012 for principal turnover and in 2013 for
eacher turnover 18 . 
We next examine teacher time use ( Table 5 and Fig. 6 ). Several
dentified activities were required as part of the transformation
nd turnaround models, but others were not. The most consistent
012 findings emerge for professional development, supervisory
uties, required committee or staff meetings, and required paper-chieve growth. Other schools mentioned an increase in teacher resignations in 
013 for teachers not meeting principal expectations ( Department of Public Instruc- 
ion, 2013b, 2014 ). 
18 Estimates differ in Table 4 and Fig. 5 because Fig. 5 uses a linear spline for all 





e  ork, each of which increased as a result of TALAS. An increase in
rofessional development was expected because it was intended
s a key component of TALAS. The increase by 2014 in communi-
ating with parents and the community was also consistent with
he TALAS program of promoting community involvement. TALAS
lso promoted the use of ongoing assessments to track student
rogress. Teachers spent more time delivering assessments in
reated schools by 2014, but they did not change the time they
pent using the results of these assessments. Some caution may
e necessary for the 2014 results given the high teacher turnover
n treated schools in 2013. 
Table 6 reports effects on teachers’ perceptions of school cli-
ate. Positive numbers indicate increases in satisfaction in treated
chools in standard deviation units. Though turnaround models
mphasize school leadership, TALAS had no effect on teachers’ per-
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Table 5 
Teacher time use; estimates by method, bandwidth and year. 
2010 2012 2014 
NP (1) NP (1) 2SLS (2) NP (1) 2SLS (2) 
Bandwidth Varies Varies + / −16% + / −10% Varies + / −16% + / −10% 
Teacher improvement 
Professional development 0.276 0.537 + 0.385 ∗∗∗ 0.311 ∗ 0.546 ∗ 0.486 ∗c 0.101 
(0.199) (0.280) (0.114) (0.139) (0.260) (0.206) (0.128) 
Individual planning 0.203 −0.129 0.045 c −0.238 0.296 −0.169 −0.144 
(0.388) (0.269) (0.368) (0.188) (0.372) (0.174) (0.211) 
Collaborative planning 1.263 ∗∗∗ 0.556 ∗ 0.186 0.163 1.025 ∗∗∗ 0.023 q 0.045 
(0.334) (0.260) (0.115) (0.148) (0.296) (0.164) (0.129) 
Utilizing results of assessments 0.377 0.642 ∗ −0.096 −0.163 −0.072 −0.096 0.052 
(0.449) (0.280) (0.115) (0.154) (0.241) (0.115) (0.145) 
Administrative burdens 
Supervisory duties −0.098 0.332 0.421 ∗q 0.270 + 0.176 0.073 0.122 
(0.327) (0.327) (0.191) (0.155) (0.164) (0.106) (0.125) 
Required committee/staff meetings 0.211 0.103 0.369 ∗∗ 0.288 + 0.761 ∗∗∗ 0.343 ∗∗ 0.257 + 
(0.238) (0.275) (0.125) (0.156) (0.231) (0.117) (0.151) 
Completing required paperwork 0.239 0.511 ∗∗ 0.309 ∗q 0.224 + 0.351 ∗ 0.001 0.476 ∗q 
(0.189) (0.187) (0.167) (0.130) (0.164) (0.106) (0.187) 
Community & students 
Communicating with parents/community 0.364 ∗∗ 0.312 −0.038 q −0.079 0.609 ∗∗∗ 0.100 0.333 + q 
(0.137) (0.205) (0.109) (0.091) (0.172) (0.085) (0.180) 
Addressing student discipline 0.091 0.340 0.099 0.304 q 0.682 0.282 0.675 q 
(0.252) (0.311) (0.164) (0.337) (0.443) (0.188) (0.413) 
Focusing on tests 
Prep for federal, state, and local tests 0.316 0.893 ∗∗∗ 0.036 0.121 0.439 ∗ 0.053 0.139 
(0.364) (0.270) (0.141) (0.181) (0.214) (0.145) (0.173) 
Delivery of assessments 0.163 0.720 ∗∗ −0.028 −0.011 0.397 0.193 + 0.606 ∗q 
(0.354) (0.238) (0.099) (0.138) (0.311) (0.115) (0.255) 
N 1753 1753 518 294 1753 518 294 
Controls for 2010 baseline composite? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls for 2010 outcome & school level? NO NO YES YES NO YES YES 
+ p-value < .1, ∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗ p-value < .01, ∗∗∗ p-value < .001. 
(1) Nonparametrics bandwidths calculated from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) . 
(2) Linear spline equation used in parametric 2SLS models unless otherwise noted; q = quadratic equation used; c = cubic equation used. 
Fig. 6. 2012 hours spent on activities per week. 
Note: estimates of outcomes in 2010 and 2014 within + / −16% using our linear spline model with no additional controls (N = 518 schools). Untreated post-period segment 
not constrained to be parallel with pre-period segments. Displayed bin width = 2-percentage points. 
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Table 6 
School climate as perceived by teachers; estimates by method, bandwidth, and year. 
2010 2012 2014 
NP (1) NP (1) 2SLS (2) NP (1) 2SLS (2) 
Bandwidth Varies Varies + / −16% + / −10% Varies + / −16% + / −10% 
Leadership 0.521 −0.447 −0.160 −0.198 −0.149 −0.088 −0.168 
(0.496) (0.651) (0.238) (0.323) (0.414) (0.247) (0.277) 
Instructional practices 1.296 ∗∗ −0.044 0.087 −0.104 −0.236 −0.277 −0.334 
(0.459) (0.372) (0.207) (0.273) (0.381) (0.227) (0.261) 
Professional development 0.851 ∗ −0.486 −0.164 −0.341 −0.073 −0.537 + q −0.398 
(0.416) (0.416) (0.253) (0.327) (0.340) −0.298 (0.257) 
Community involvement 0.195 −0.488 −0.086 −0.172 −0.586 + −0.157 −0.217 
(0.423) (0.489) (0.207) (0.264) (0.341) (0.193) (0.248) 
Student conduct 0.509 −0.292 0.035 0.131 −0.251 −0.140 −0.088 
(0.440) (0.414) (0.221) (0.278) (0.500) (0.241) (0.281) 
Facilities & resources 0.309 −0.884 ∗ −0.368 + −0.566 ∗ −0.248 −0.265 −0.276 
(0.404) (0.479) (0.232) (0.301) (0.372) (0.220) (0.263) 
Time 0.546 −0.505 −0.251 −0.517 + −0.221 −0.399 + −0.479 + 
(0.404) (0.479) (0.232) (0.301) (0.420) (0.211) (0.261) 
N 1753 1753 518 294 1753 518 294 
Controls for 2010 baseline composite? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls for 2010 outcome & school level? NO NO YES YES NO YES YES 
+ p-value < .1, ∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗ p-value < .01, ∗∗∗ p-value < .001. 
(1) Nonparametric bandwidths calculated from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) . 
(2) Linear spline equation used in parametric 2SLS models unless otherwise noted; q = quadratic equation used; c = cubic equation used. 
Fig. 7. Student-level movement. 
Note: estimates of probability of remaining in the same school from 2010 to 2012 for students who were in third or sixth grade in 2010. Analysis conducted at the student 




















6  eptions of the quality of their schools’ leadership. Nor did it have
uch effect on teachers’ perceptions of the quality of professional
evelopment or community involvement. Some hints of dissatis-
action with facilities and resources emerged in 2012 (95% CI for
 / −16% estimate [ −0.823, 0.087]), along with concerns about time
ressures in 2014 (95% CI [ −0.813, 0.015]). 
Finally, we find evidence that TALAS led to differential move-
ent of students. Fig. 7 displays an RD analysis that focuses
n students who were third or sixth graders in schools + / −16
ercentage points from the cut point in 2010. The chance that FRLtudents changed schools was fairly constant across the cut point.
owever, non-FRL students were much less likely to remain in
he same school if they were in a school assigned to treatment in
010, relative to those students not in treated schools ( p = 0.009).
n other words, more affluent students from treated schools were
ore likely to attend a different school two years later than their
ess affluent counterparts. Table 7 confirms the increase in the
roportion of FRL students at the school level across all years and
cross all methods. The 2014 point estimates range from a 3.4 to
.0 percentage point increase in the proportion of FRL students in
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Table 7 
School-level student composition; estimates by method and year. 
2012 2013 2014 
NP (1) 2SLS (2) NP (1) 2SLS (2) NP (1) 2SLS (2) 
Bandwidth Varies + / −16% + / −10% Varies + / −16% + / −10% Varies + / −16% + / −10% 
Percent FRL students 4.652 + 2.842 ∗ 3.886 ∗ 5.020 + 2.415 3.881 ∗ 5.996 ∗ 3.427 ∗ 4.197 ∗
(2.654) (1.447) (1.748) (2.999) (1.484) (1.754) (2.938) (1.515) (1.731) 
Percent black students 5.227 0.596 −0.004 7.719 0.596 1.880 9.377 1.881 2.135 
(5.216) (0.966) (1.259) (6.942) (0.966) (1.522) (7.436) (1.335) (1.717) 
Percent Hispanic students −2.734 −0.276 q −0.032 −3.429 −0.180 −0.428 −4.220 −0.529 −1.295 
(3.985) (1.138) (1.026) (3.747) (0.948) (1.194) (4.084) (1.013) (1.225) 
N 1753 518 294 1753 518 294 1753 518 294 
Controls for 2010 baseline composite? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls for 2010 outcome & school level? NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Includes baseline observations? NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
+ p-value < .1, ∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗ p-value < .01, ∗∗∗ p-value < .001. 
(1) Nonparametric bandwidths calculated from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) . 




































































f  treated school 19 . There is no effect for the percentages of black or
Hispanic students. 
7. Robustness checks and alternative explanations 
An RD design relies on the assumption that assignment is “as
good as random” around the cutoff point, or, alternatively, that we
specify the correct functional form. We have already reported sev-
eral findings relevant to the validity of the assumptions that un-
derlie our analysis, specifically finding that schools did not ma-
nipulate the assignment variable and that baseline characteristics
were balanced at the cutoff. Van der Klaauw (2008) recommends
using outcome data from a period before the program was put into
place as a falsification or placebo test. With minimal exceptions,
we found no such placebo discontinuities, indicating that the ef-
fect came from the program itself (see Table 1 , the first column of
Tables 5–6 , and Figs. 3 and 5 ). In addition, we used several mod-
els at different bandwidths to increase our confidence in our esti-
mates. 
One possible remaining concern is that other programs that
were operating in North Carolina during this time could have af-
fected our estimates, but only if their uptake was discontinuous
at the TALAS cutoff point. For example, as noted NCDPI oper-
ated a district turnaround program during this period. In addition,
NCDPI’s Federal Programs division operated programs required by
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act ( Department of Pub-
lic Instruction, 2015 ). Interviews with NCDPI staff indicated that
the transformation division and Federal Programs division were
distinct, with Federal Programs focusing on monitoring and TALAS
on coaching. Nonetheless some of the projects under Federal Pro-
grams targeted schools that were also part of the TALAS program.
In analysis shown in Appendix C , we examine whether there was
an increase in the probability of assignment to these programs at
the TALAS cut point, which would violate the exclusion restriction.
We find no evidence of such a jump, which gives us confidence in
our estimates of the effects of the school-level TALAS program in
the RD design. 19 Non-movers (i.e., stayers), on average, were higher-achievers in the baseline 
2010 year, scoring 0.192 SD higher in math and 0.162 SD higher in reading than 
movers. After controlling for school-level baseline scores (the running variable), 
this advantage remains large in control schools (e.g., 0.170 SD in math). However, 
the “stayer advantage” in baseline scores for the treated schools was much smaller 
(e.g., 0.087 SD in math). This implies that the leavers were more-advantaged in the 








a  . Conclusion 
We find little evidence that North Carolina’s TALAS program,
hich was funded by federal Race to the Top money and designed
o turn around the state’s lowest performing schools, had the in-
ended positive effects for elementary and middle schools near
he cut point for eligibility. Indeed, most of our estimated coef-
cients are consistent with the conclusion that the program re-
uced school wide pass rates and reduced the rates for some sub-
roups such as female students in math and male students in read-
ng. Moreover, we show that the program affected the mix of stu-
ents in the treated schools. The resulting greater concentration
f low-income students in the treated schools could account for
ome of the disappointing findings at the school level. At the stu-
ent level, the program may have led to higher scores and pass
ates for the third grade students who were on the borderline of
assing in math in 2010, but the improvements were short-lived.
he program also may have reduced the test scores of the highest-
chieving students in reading. 
Hence, our results provide strong causal evidence against ex-
anding the TALAS program at the margin. This conclusion con-
rasts with the implications of other recent research showing pos-
tive results for the same program ( Henry et al., 2014, 2015 ). That
esearch was based on a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis
ith the positive results largely driven by positive effects for the
owest performing schools. 
Fig. 2 , described earlier, provides a visual depiction of the differ-
ng conclusions from the two methodologies. In particular, it shows
ull to negative differences across treated and control schools near
he cut point (RD) but null to positive differences if the changes
re averaged across the full range of data (DID). Our RD design
revents us from making strong causal conclusions about the effec-
iveness of the program for the very low-performing schools well
elow the eligibility cut point. 
The difference between the RD estimates and the DID esti-
ates could be caused by (at least) three factors that are not
utually exclusive. First, TALAS could have been more effective
or the lowest-achieving schools. Second, changes to the test led
o passing rates dropping in all schools from baseline to the
ost-intervention years. The lowest-achieving schools may have
it a floor, limiting their ability to drop further. Third, differences
n outcomes at the lower end of the test score distribution could
ave been driven by the continuing effects of prior and concurrent
nterventions. As we document in Table 1 , and discuss in detail in
ppendix C , many of the treated elementary and middle schools
lso received prior state turnaround and other programmatic




















































































































r  nterventions. Because those other interventions were not based
n the same eligibility requirements as TALAS, they would not
nterfere with our RD findings. They would, however, muddy
he interpretation of DID models. That problem is exacerbated
y the fact that the earlier studies included in the analysis not
ust the treated elementary and middle schools, but also the
ALAS high schools, many of which were the target of major state
nterventions in prior years. Based on the reasonable assumption
hat turnaround programs and other state interventions may take
everal years to generate effects, we believe the DID strategy in
he earlier research did not successfully isolate the effects of the
ALAS program. In contrast, by measuring effects close to the cut
oint, our RD results are not driven by schools at the bottom of
he distribution, which were most likely to have received multiple
nterventions. Robustness checks confirm our results; for instance,
hrinking the bandwidth decreased sample size and increased
tandard errors, but did not change the direction of treatment
ffects. 
The availability of North Carolina’s biannual Teacher Working
onditions Survey allows us to open the black box to examine how
eacher activities changed under a turnaround regimen. We con-
lude first that substantial changes occurred in the treated schools.
s required by the program, the schools brought in new princi-
als and increased the time teachers devoted to professional de-
elopment. But the program also increased administrative bur-
ens, increased teacher turnover, and distracted teachers, poten-
ially reducing the time available for instruction. We conclude that
he TALAS program generated few significant changes for teach-
rs that would be consistent with an academically more produc-
ive environment in the schools, at least in the short run. Con-
eivably more professional development or collaborative planning
ould help teachers, but the clearest picture that emerges in the
ost-turnaround environment is one in which teachers have heav-
er administrative burdens, more paperwork, and a sense that
hey have fewer resources. The mixture of principal replacement,
eacher turnover, and teacher professional development were ap-
arently not sufficient to generate the positive changes in instruc-
ional practices or transformational leadership needed to raise stu-
ent achievement in those schools, and indeed may have reduced
t. 
Our analysis is necessarily limited to relatively short-run effects,
amely effects in 2012 (the first year after the program was fully
mplemented), 2013, and 2014. Hence, we cannot rule out the pos-
ibility that more positive effects may emerge over time. A report
n the North Carolina program on which TALAS was based clearly
mphasized the need for continuity ( Thomson, Brown, Townsend,
enry, & Fortner, 2011 ). Although researchers should continue to
ollow-up with these schools, the short-term nature of Race to
he Top funding could make program sustainability difficult ( Anrig,
015 ). 
At the same time, we are not optimistic about the program’s
uture success in part because it may be focusing on the wrong
bjects. To the extent that the failure of low performing schools
eflects the challenges that disadvantaged students bring to the
lassroom, and not simply poor leadership or instruction, more
ttention to those challenges may be necessary in the form, for
xample, of health clinics, counselors, or mental health special-
sts 20 . Moreover, disadvantaged students need effective teachers
nd within-school structures of academic and social support to20 Certain schools’ annual reports mentioned programs like Child Family Support 
eams comprised of the school nurse, guidance counselor, social worker, and ad- 
inistrators that attempt to connect families to community resources ( Department 
f Public Instruction, 2013a ). Other schools used backpack programs to provide 
ood over the weekend for low-income children. However, because schools designed 






ucceed. We find little evidence that North Carolina’s turnaround
rogram led to changes of this type in the state’s lowest perform-
ng schools, and hence it is not surprising that the program failed
o realize its goals. Rural schools in particular may require differ-
nt staffing strategies than other school types. One potential les-
on from the North Carolina experience is that turning around low
erforming schools is difficult, and that, while changes in leader-
hip and other short-term changes may often be necessary for such
hange, they are far from sufficient to address the deep long term
hallenges that such schools face. 
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ppendix A. School climate constructs 
This section provides details on North Carolina’s biannual
eacher Working Conditions Survey and our factor analysis strat-
gy. Teachers answered 83 questions about school climate that ap-
eared on the 2010, 2012, and 2014 versions of the survey. We
sed the factor program in Stata 12 to break these questions into
elated factor constructs (using principal factor analysis). We took
he factors with Eigen values above one to create seven constructs:
eadership, instructional practices, professional development, com- 
unity involvement, student conduct, facilities and resources, and
ime use. We used the variable weighting from the 2010 factor
nalysis on 2012 and 2014 data to create 2012 and 2014 factors,
espectively. 
Table A.1 displays the survey wording, the top factor for each
uestion as indicated by the factor analysis, and a splined linear
stimate for the effect of treatment on the factor in 2012 and 2014
or our two main bandwidths. Each construct may have weight in
ultiple constructs; the table displays the main factor component
or each question. Using this primary category, the constructs have
he following Cronbach’s alphas: leadership (0.991), instructional
ractices (0.900), professional development (0.976), community in-
olvement (0.961), student conduct (0.950), facilities and resources
0.921), and time use (0.921). 
Within the instructional practices construct, treated teachers
ere particularly dissatisfied with local assessment data being
vailable in time to impact instructional practices in 2014. Within
he time use construct, treated teachers were particularly dissat-
sfied with being able to focus on students with minimal inter-
uptions (in 2014), the amount of instructional time to meet all
tudents’ needs (in 2014), and being protected from duties that in-
erfere with their essential role of educating students (in 2012 and
014). rams may have existed even before TALAS. Future research should systematically 
eview these programs to understand what effect, if any, they may have. 
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Table A.1 
Survey items and factors. 
Construct Question 2012, + / −16% 2012, + / −10% 2014, + / −16% 2014, + / −10% 
School leadership Teachers are recognized as educational experts. −0.073 (0.063) −0.096 (0.084) −0.057 (0.069) −0.074 (0.080) 
Teachers are trusted to make sound professional decisions 
about instruction. 
−0.072 (0.069) −0.094 (0.092) −0.049 (0.080) −0.036 (0.093) 
Teachers are relied upon to make decisions about 
educational issues. 
−0.069 (0.063) −0.094 (0.082) −0.036 (0.070) −0.036 (0.084) 
Teachers are encouraged to participate in school leadership 
roles. 
−0.023 (0.053) −0.058 (0.070) 0.002 (0.053) −0.025 (0.058) 
The faculty has an effective process for making group 
decisions to solve problems. 
0.0 0 0 (0.073) −0.019 (0.098) −0.024 (0.075) −0.040 (0.085) 
In this school we take steps to solve problems. −0.011 (0.070) −0.032 (0.094) −0.037 (0.078) −0.064 (0.090) 
Teachers are effective leaders in this school. −0.036 (0.056) −0.038 (0.076) −0.016 (0.065) −0.032 (0.073) 
Teachers have an appropriate level of influence on decision 
making in this school. 
−0.069 (0.067) −0.043 (0.091) −0.045 (0.072) −0.103 (0.079) 
The faculty and staff have a shared vision. −0.022 (0.068) −0.010 (0.094) −0.029 (0.073) −0.080 (0.081) 
There is an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect in this 
school. 
−0.063 (0.088) −0.056 (0.123) −0.037 (0.094) −0.069 (0.105) 
Teachers feel comfortable raising issues and concerns that 
are important to them. 
−0.044 (0.091) −0.031 (0.123) 0.042 (0.091) 0.022 (0.104) 
The school leadership consistently supports teachers. −0.038 (0.085) −0.022 (0.116) 0.014 (0.090) −0.023 (0.100) 
Teachers are held to high professional standards for 
delivering instruction. 
−0.004 (0.044) −0.028 (0.057) −0.053 (0.054) −0.069 (0.063) 
Teacher performance is assessed objectively. −0.038 (0.064) −0.062 (0.084) −0.002 (0.069) −0.014 (0.077) 
Teachers receive feedback that can help them improve 
teaching. 
−0.031 (0.068) −0.093 (0.088) −0.019 (0.076) −0.080 (0.086) 
The procedures for teacher evaluation are consistent. −0.055 (0.074) −0.107 (0.093) −0.072 (0.085) −0.119 (0.090) 
The school improvement team provides effective leadership 
at this school. 
−0.058 (0.068) −0.077 (0.093) −0.044 (0.067) −0.089 (0.075) 
The faculty are recognized for accomplishments. −0.028 (0.075) −0.052 (0.099) 0.014 (0.069) −0.048 (0.080) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: Leadership issues 
−0.036 (0.072) −0.034 (0.098) −0.051 (0.072) −0.064 (0.083) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: Facilities and resources 
−0.031 (0.060) −0.058 (0.079) −0.053 (0.065) −0.087 (0.073) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: The use of time in my school 
−0.047 (0.069) −0.059 (0.095) −0.017 (0.073) −0.033 (0.084) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: Professional development 
−0.099 (0.065) −0.111 (0.087) −0.073 (0.064) −0.110 (0.074) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: Teacher leadership 
−0.016 (0.062) −0.044 (0.083) −0.062 (0.066) −0.086 (0.078) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: Community support and 
involvement 
−0.033 (0.059) −0.049 (0.079) −0.024 (0.066) −0.049 (0.073) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: Managing student conduct 
−0.018 (0.077) 0.018 (0.106) −0.009 (0.079) −0.014 (0.090) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: Instructional practices and 
support 
−0.044 (0.061) −0.071 (0.082) −0.048 (0.064) −0.087 (0.075) 
The school leadership makes a sustained effort to address 
teacher concerns about: New teacher support 
−0.019 (0.071) 0.012 (0.093) −0.044 (0.076) −0.016 (0.093) 
Teachers are encouraged to try new things to improve 
instruction. 
−0.007 (0.048) −0.040 (0.063) −0.007 (0.046) −0.015 (0.054) 
Teachers have autonomy to make decisions about 
instructional delivery (i.e. pacing, materials and 
pedagogy). 
−0.069 (0.065) −0.112 (0.086) 0.014 (0.061) 0.004 (0.075) 
Overall, my school is a good place to work and learn. −0.056 (0.067) −0.043 (0.091) −0.062 (0.081) −0.070 (0.095) 
Professional development Sufficient resources are available for professional 
development in my school. 
−0.009 (0.056) −0.054 (0.068) −0.041 (0.063) −0.095 (0.068) 
An appropriate amount of time is provided for professional 
development. 
−0.008 (0.054) −0.084 (0.068) −0.011 (0.057) −0.052 (0.063) 
Professional development offerings are data driven. 0.017 (0.058) −0.045 (0.075) −0.015 (0.049) −0.029 (0.059) 
Professional learning opportunities are aligned with the 
school’s improvement plan. 
−0.031 (0.047) −0.062 (0.061) −0.014 (0.051) −0.074 (0.056) 
Professional development is differentiated to meet the 
individual needs of teachers. 
−0.060 (0.066) −0.066 (0.088) −0.053 (0.068) −0.114 (0.076) 
Professional development deepens teachers’ content 
knowledge. 
−0.024 (0.055) −0.052 (0.073) −0.043 (0.054) −0.091 (0.063) 
Teachers have sufficient training to fully utilize 
instructional technology. 
−0.093 (0.064) −0.095 (0.084) −0.025 (0.059) −0.064 (0.066) 
Teachers are encouraged to reflect on their own practice. −0.014 (0.043) −0.031 (0.055) −0.0 0 0 (0.044) −0.028 (0.048) 
In this school, follow up is provided from professional 
development. 
−0.033 (0.063) −0.058 (0.083) −0.064 (0.069) −0.123 + (0.074) 
Professional development provides ongoing opportunities 
for teachers to work with colleagues to refine teaching 
practices. 
−0.036 (0.059) −0.047 (0.078) −0.043 (0.056) −0.081 (0.065) 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table A.1 ( continued ) 
Construct Question 2012, + / −16% 2012, + / −10% 2014, + / −16% 2014, + / −10% 
Professional development is evaluated and results are 
communicated to teachers. 
−0.040 (0.068) −0.083 (0.090) −0.031 (0.063) −0.054 (0.078) 
Professional development enhances teachers’ ability to 
implement instructional strategies that meet diverse 
student learning needs. 
−0.033 (0.054) −0.064 (0.072) −0.044 (0.053) −0.083 (0.063) 
Professional development enhances teachers’ abilities to 
improve student learning. 
−0.050 (0.051) −0.074 (0.069) −0.047 (0.050) −0.100 + (0.059) 
Community-school relations Parents/guardians are influential decision makers in this 
school. 
−0.062 (0.060) −0.073 (0.085) −0.080 (0.077) −0.153 (0.094) 
This school maintains clear, two-way communication with 
the community. 
−0.036 (0.056) −0.029 (0.077) −0.020 (0.064) −0.039 (0.079) 
This school does a good job of encouraging 
parent/guardian involvement. 
−0.047 (0.059) −0.068 (0.080) −0.033 (0.067) −0.046 (0.081) 
Teachers provide parents/guardians with useful information 
about student learning. 
−0.020 (0.035) −0.020 (0.044) −0.030 (0.043) −0.031 (0.052) 
Parents/guardians know what is going on in this school. −0.013 (0.056) −0.017 (0.077) −0.026 (0.061) −0.026 (0.072) 
Parents/guardians support teachers, contributing to their 
success with students. 
0.039 (0.054) 0.006 (0.073) −0.007 (0.064) −0.045 (0.080) 
Community members support teachers, contributing to 
their success with students. 
0.039 (0.056) −0.010 (0.078) −0.101 (0.072) −0.167 + (0.088) 
The community we serve is supportive of this school. −0.024 (0.064) −0.088 (0.085) −0.063 (0.069) −0.086 (0.091) 
Students at this school understand expectations for their 
conduct. 
−0.037 (0.067) −0.037 (0.087) 0.0 0 0 (0.076) −0.001 (0.085) 
Facilities & resources Teachers have sufficient access to appropriate instructional 
materials. 
−0.101 (0.070) −0.156 + (0.081) −0.054 (0.073) −0.078 (0.086) 
Teachers have sufficient access to instructional technology, 
including computers, printers, software and internet 
access. 
−0.110 (0.088) −0.187 + (0.109) −0.024 (0.077) 0.004 (0.092) 
Teachers have access to reliable communication 
technology, including phones, faxes and email. 
−0.089 (0.062) −0.145 + (0.078) −0.072 (0.063) −0.080 (0.073) 
Teachers have sufficient access to office equipment and 
supplies such as copy machines, paper, pens, etc. 
−0.056 (0.078) −0.122 (0.096) −0.069 (0.084) −0.130 (0.095) 
Teachers have sufficient access to a broad range of 
professional support personnel. 
−0.032 (0.054) −0.035 (0.070) −0.007 (0.056) −0.027 (0.063) 
The school environment is clean and well maintained. −0.091 (0.064) −0.107 (0.091) −0.058 (0.076) 0.014 (0.100) 
Teachers have adequate space to work productively. −0.075 (0.054) −0.123 + (0.069) −0.074 (0.051) −0.061 (0.065) 
The physical environment of classrooms in this school 
supports teaching and learning. 
−0.092 + (0.053) −0.106 (0.072) −0.056 (0.054) −0.051 (0.068) 
The reliability and speed of Internet connections in this 
school are sufficient to support instructional practices. 
−0.076 (0.074) −0.127 (0.095) −0.114 (0.075) −0.145 (0.089) 
Student conduct Students at this school follow rules of conduct. −0.051 (0.087) −0.065 (0.117) −0.060 (0.102) −0.060 (0.125) 
Policies and procedures about student conduct are clearly 
understood by the faculty. 
0.004 (0.061) 0.031 (0.083) −0.043 (0.070) −0.019 (0.082) 
School administrators consistently enforce rules for student 
conduct. 
0.027 (0.101) 0.086 (0.131) −0.035 (0.109) −0.007 (0.127) 
School administrators support teachers’ effort s to maintain 
discipline in the classroom. 
0.037 (0.096) 0.059 (0.125) −0.010 (0.095) 0.020 (0.109) 
Teachers consistently enforce rules for student conduct. −0.007 (0.046) −0.006 (0.061) −0.066 (0.051) −0.065 (0.064) 
The faculty work in a school environment that is safe. −0.031 (0.059) −0.009 (0.079) −0.078 (0.070) −0.058 (0.082) 
Instructional practices The school leadership facilitates using data to improve 
student learning. 
−0.031 (0.051) −0.068 (0.066) −0.051 (0.055) −0.060 (0.066) 
State assessment data are available in time to impact 
instructional practices. 
0.038 (0.046) −0.025 (0.058) −0.091 (0.056) −0.106 (0.071) 
Local assessment data are available in time to impact 
instructional practices. 
0.018 (0.046) −0.019 (0.060) −0.084 + (0.050) −0.104 + (0.058) 
Teachers use assessment data to inform their instruction. −0.001 (0.034) −0.025 (0.048) −0.055 (0.038) −0.065 (0.044) 
Teachers work in professional learning communities to 
develop and align instructional practices. 
−0.020 (0.048) −0.037 (0.064) −0.049 (0.050) −0.035 (0.057) 
Provided supports (i.e. instructional coaching, professional 
learning communities, etc.) translate to improvements in 
instructional practices by teachers. 
−0.012 (0.049) −0.021 (0.063) −0.026 (0.049) −0.042 (0.056) 
Time Class sizes are reasonable such that teachers have the time 
available to meet the needs of all students. 
−0.072 (0.086) −0.119 (0.112) −0.062 (0.090) −0.054 (0.105) 
Teachers have time available to collaborate with colleagues. −0.090 (0.074) −0.162 + (0.095) −0.105 (0.066) −0.108 (0.080) 
Teachers are allowed to focus on educating students with 
minimal interruptions. 
−0.044 (0.073) −0.095 (0.095) −0.147 + (0.083) −0.186 + (0.099) 
The non-instructional time provided for teachers in my 
school is sufficient. 
−0.103 (0.079) −0.150 (0.107) −0.129 (0.086) −0.148 (0.097) 
Efforts are made to minimize the amount of routine 
paperwork teachers are required to do. 
−0.068 (0.073) −0.178 + (0.093) −0.101 (0.076) −0.173 ∗ (0.084) 
Teachers have sufficient instructional time to meet the 
needs of all students. 
−0.033 (0.054) −0.112 + (0.067) −0.144 ∗ (0.061) −0.174 ∗ (0.074) 
Teachers are protected from duties that interfere with their 
essential role of educating students. 
−0.139 ∗ (0.068) −0.201 ∗ (0.084) −0.115 + (0.069) −0.169 ∗ (0.077) 
Teachers are assigned classes that maximize their 
likelihood of success with students. 
−0.002 (0.070) −0.026 (0.094) −0.024 (0.065) −0.031 (0.077) 












































































































o  Appendix B. Details on the estimation strategy 
We provide additional details on our estimation strategies in
the following sections. 
B.1. Nonparametric estimation 
Our “nonparametric” estimates are in fact a series of local lin-
ear regressions performed at various bandwidths on either side of
the cutoff. We use the optimal bandwidths proposed by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2011) as our preferred bandwidth. We specify
a triangular kernel, which tends to be the most accurate at the
frontier ( Fan & Gijbels, 1996 ). The IK bandwidths differ between
estimates depending on the relationship between the assignment
variable and the outcome variable. We use the full range of data in
this analysis (N = 1753 schools). 
B.2. Parametric analysis – school-level analysis 
We implement a fuzzy RD design with a two-stage parametric
model that functions as an instrumental variable analysis ( Hahn
et al., 2001; Lee & Lemieux, 2010; Van Der Klaauw, 2008 ). The
first-stage model estimates the jump in treatment probability at
the cutoff point, with the following general form: 
T urnaroun d s = α I ( A s ≤ 0 ) + f ( A s ) + γ X s + νs (1)
where f(A s ) is a function of schools’s baseline assignment variable
and ( X s ) represents baseline control variables. The function f(A s ) is
allowed to differ on each side of the cutoff. Because the disconti-
nuity essentially functions as random assignment, including base-
line covariates is not strictly necessary ( Lee & Lemieux, 2010 ); we
include them in practice to reduce sampling variability. In some
specifications, the parametric RD models include the baseline level
of the outcome variable and school type. Including this control has
no effect on the overall results but increases the precision of the
estimates. The coefficient α represents the percentage point in-
crease in the probability of receiving treatment at the cutoff. We
estimate the 2SLS estimate of the effect of this jump in continuity
with the following: 
 s = π ̂ T urnaroun d s + g ( A s ) + βX s + ε s (2)
where Y s is the outcome of interest regressed on the predicted
probability of receiving the turnaround treatment, a function of
school’s assignment variable g(A s ) , and the control variables X s in-
cluded in Model 1. Under assumptions of monotonicity (that is, no
individuals are less likely to take up treatment if they are assigned
to it) and excludability, this system of equations functions as an in-
strumental variable estimate and its estimand, π , should be inter-
preted as a local average treatment effect (LATE, Angrist & Pischke,
2009; Angrist et al., 1996; Hahn et al., 2001 ). In other words, the
estimate is only for those whose uptake is affected by the assign-
ment around the cut point. 
Because we do not know the “true” relationship between
the outcome and the assignment variable, we cannot be certain
whether f(A s ) and g(A s ) should be linear, quadratic, cubic, or some-
thing else entirely. Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest a test to find
the best-fitting parametric form. Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest
starting with a linear model, inserting bin indicator variables into
the polynomial regression, and jointly testing their significance. For
instance, we placed K-2 bin indicators (each two percentage points
wide), B k , for k = 2 to K – 1, into our model above: 
 s = π ̂ T urnaroun d s + g ( A s ) + βX s + 
K−1 ∑ 
k =2 
ϕ k B k + ε s (3)We then tested the null hypothesis that ϕ 2 = ϕ 3 = … = ϕK- 1 = 0.
tarting with a first order polynomial (flexible across the disconti-
uity), we added a higher order to the model until the bin indi-
ator variables were no longer jointly significant. This method also
ests for discontinuities at unexpected points along the assignment
ariable; we did not find any. We limit the flexibility to a third-
rder polynomial. Our models use the simplest model not rejected
y this test; the vast majority have a linear spline on either side of
he cutoff. 
.3. Parametric analysis – student-level analysis 
For our analysis of the effects on student-level test scores, we
se longitudinal data for individual students who were in third
rade in a school + / −16 percentage points from the cut point in
010, and limit the outcome variables to the year 2012. For our
nalysis of how the program affects the composition of students
ithin a school, we use data for students in both 3rd and 6th
rades in 2010. We limit the population to these grades because
hey are the most likely to remain in the same school after imple-
entation in 2012. Fourth and fifth graders likely moved to middle
chool by 2012, while seventh and eighth graders likely moved to
igh school. The analysis does not restrict the students to schools
hat remained open through 2014 in order to follow students as
hey move between available public schools. 
The first stage predicts the probability of the student’s 2010
chool receiving treatment based on their 2010 composite score.
he second stage predicts the outcome of interest. This is the same
s asking, given that your 2010 school received treatment, how
id you do relative to a student whose 2010 school did not re-
eive treatment? Students who change schools across years con-
inue to be assigned to their baseline school. The analysis can also
e considered an intent-to-treat analysis, with the note that the
rst stage accounts for the small fuzziness of the assignment at the
chool level. This student-level approach is limited to one cohort of
tudents, but it avoids potential interpretation challenges related to
ompositional changes in schools, as we follow the students re-
ardless of the school they attend. We follow students whether
hey are retained or skip a grade, as long as they remain in a pub-
ic school in North Carolina. Robust standard errors are clustered
y the 2010 school. 
Additionally, we can examine outcomes based on how far stu-
ents were from passing in 2010. In the baseline year, North Car-
lina placed students in four categories based on their test scores:
evels I and II did not pass, and Levels III and IV passed. This sub-
roup analysis permits us to determine how the turnaround pro-
ram affected students with different levels of pretreatment aca-
emic performance. 
ppendix C. Discontinuities in simultaneous programs 
Additional programs could have affected the schools during
he study period, including the original North Carolina school
urnaround effort s, district-level RttT District turnaround, and El-
mentary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) programs operated
y NCDPI’s Federal Programs division. The worry with these pro-
rams is that they may differentially occur on either side of the
D cut point. 
There is no jump in assignment to the original school
urnaround program or RttT District Turnaround at the cut point
see Fig. C.1 ). However, schools well below the cut point were
ore likely to be in these programs, which cautions against using
ifference-in-difference (DID) approaches. 
There are three ESEA school distinctions: Reward, Focus, and
riority. Reward Schools are recognized as either high-achieving
r high-growth with banners and public recognition. NCDPI must
J.A. Heissel, H.F. Ladd / Economics of Education Review 62 (2018) 302–320 319 
Fig. C.1. Uptake of ESEA reward/priority/focus schools. 
Note: nonparametric estimates based on 100% IK bandwidth. Displayed bin width = 2-percentage points. “2007 Turnaround” is the original turnaround program that the 
TALAS treatment was based on. “RttT District” is the district-level TALAS treatment based on 2011 test results. “ESEA Reward” is the 2012 assignment to the ESEA Reward 
designation. “ESEA Focus/Priority” is the 2012 assignment to either the ESEA Focus or ESEA Priority designation. All of these programs came with potentially different 

























































lso recognize 5% of Title I schools as Priority and 10% as Focus
chools, at which point local school districts must provide various
rograms to students. Schools were assigned to their ESEA dis-
inction using 2011 data, and schools remained in their category
rom the 2013 through 2015 school years. The assignment deci-
ion was announced at the end of the 2012 school year, and thus
ould not have affected our 2012 results ( Department of Public In-
truction, 2012 ). Moreover, to affect our 2013 and 2014 estimates
here would have to be a difference in the ESEA program assign-
ent at the 2010 TALAS cutoff. This is unlikely, because TALAS
nd ESEA schools do not have the same assignment mechanism.
ssignment to an ESEA distinction was based on different years
nd either growth or absolute scores. Indeed, we find no statis-
ically significant relationship between these programs at the cut
oint (see Fig. C.1 ). The assignments largely match expectations,
ith higher-achieving schools more likely to receive Reward dis-
inction and lower-achieving schools more likely to be labeled Pri-
rity/Focus. However, the probability of assignment to these dis-
inctions is about equal just above and below the cutoff point. This
ives us confidence about our estimate as a LATE, though it cau-
ions against using DID strategies. 
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